Why Do Social Skills Matter? by Suren Basov
Why Do Social Skills Matter?
Suren Basov
March 7, 2002Abstract
In this paper I propose a model where social skills of a manager signal the
workers that their e¤ort is productive. In this model …rms with a high
productivity of e¤ort hire a socially skilled manager and pay higher wages,
and workers hired by these …rms exert higher e¤ort. In a broader context,
the paper argues the employees are compensated with a higher wage and
better working conditions for higher levels of e¤ort.I. INTRODUCTION
To achieve success in today’s world with its emphasis on collaboration,
team work, motivation, and leadership one needs to develop interpersonal
skills. This maxim is widely appreciated by the practitioners and numerous
seminars and courses teach the techniques for improvement of the general
and speci…c types of social skills. Popular books on social skills development
become best-sellers [e. g., Carnegie 1970]. However, there exists no economic
literature that incorporates social skills into a formal model. Why is it im-
portant for a top manager to show an appreciation of a subordinate’s work,
rather then simply provide him with an incentive contract? If the acquisition
of social skills is costly, should anybody invest in them at all?
The most obvious answer to the question “Why do social skills matter?”
is that employees value them. If this is the case then hiring a manager
with a high level of social skills can be considered as creating good working
conditions for an employee. This will allow …rms to pay lower wages, which
may be pro…table. Another possibility is that high social skills of a manager
signal the worker that the marginal product of her e¤ort is high and induce
her to exert a higher level of e¤ort .
In this paper I develop a model that addresses these issues. I assume that
1each …rm has to hire a manager and a worker. The …rm’s expected pro…ts
depend upon the technical expertise of the manager and the worker’s e¤ort.
Assume that the marginal product of worker’s e¤ort is di¤erent across the
…rms and is not observable by the worker. The manager’s social skills, being
unproductive per se, signal the worker the marginal product of her e¤ort, and
hence induces her to exert higher e¤ort in equilibrium. This idea is broadly
consistent with the explanation of social psychologists [e. g., Fontana 1990]
that show to people and they then work harder.
In order to rationalize such behavior, one has to assume that the social
skills of a manager are negatively correlated with her technical expertise.
This assumption can be justi…ed by postulating that a …xed amount of time
should be divided between acquisition of the technical skills or the social
skills. Think, for example, of a situation where a future manager ful…lled the
basic course requirements of a business school and has to choose an elective,
which will improve either her social or her technical skills. If technical and
social skills of a manager are negatively correlated then hiring a manager with
high social skills the …rm forgoes some pro…ts, and hence sends a credible
signal to a worker that his e¤ort has high a marginal product.
I will show that, under certain assumption on the parameters of the
2model, there exists a separating equilibrium in which the e¤ort sensitive …rms
hire socially skilled managers and the e¤ort insensitive …rms hire technically
skilled manages. Hence, in a general equilibrium, the fraction of managers
who invest in social skills equals the fraction of …rms with high marginal
product of e¤ort. In my model …rms have full bargaining power in devis-
ing contracts, so both the workers and the managers in equilibrium receive
utility equal to the their reservation level. In particular, this means that nei-
ther kind of managers is better o¤. However, if an unexpected technological
change raising the marginal product of e¤ort1 suddenly occurs the managers
with social skills will be in a short supply, and will be able to extract eco-
nomic rents. There exists some causal evidence that this is indeed happening
[Fontana, 1990].
Note that the model implies a positive correlation between wage and ef-
fort. This implies that the model is observationally equivalent to an e¢ciency
wage model.2 The crucial di¤erence between the model developed in this pa-
per and an e¢ciency wage model is that in this model a higher wage does
not cause higher e¤ort. Rather they both are caused by the higher marginal
1Such a change is consistent with a skilled-biased technological progress, which also
manifests itself in a growing premium on education [Berman, Bound, and Stephen 1998]
2For an overview of the e¢ciency wage models, see Katz (1986).
3product of e¤ort.
II. THE MODEL
Assume there is a continuum of …rms with total measure N and each
…rm needs a manager and a worker. The population contains a continuum of
workers and a continuum of managers, each with total measure ®N, where
® > 1. The last assumption is made to give …rms all the bargaining power,
however ® may be arbitrary close to one, so the equilibrium unemployment
rate can be made arbitrary small. Assume that there two types of managers.
A manager is of a technical type if she possesses high technical skills and low
social skills, and of a social type if she possesses high social and low technical
skills. The type of a manager is publicly observable. Direct contribution of
a manager to the pro…ts of a …rm equals her level of technical skills ° 2 f°L;
°Hg. The reservation wage of a manager is
_
w irrespectively of her type.3 A
contribution to the pro…ts (output) of a worker who exerts e¤ort e is
¦ = ¯e + "; (1)
3The reservation wage will be engogenized later
4where " is normally distributed with zeromean and variance ¾2. The marginal
value of e¤ort, ¯ 2 f¯L;¯Hg. There are ·N …rms with ¯ = ¯H, where · · 1.
I will refer to …rms with ¯ = ¯H as e¤ort responsive …rms.
Workers do not know ¯ . They, however, observe the type of manager.
The …rmcan observe the type ofmanager and the output produced by worker.
The worker’s utility is given by:




where w is the agent’s payment (wage) conditioned on e through ¦.
1. Partial Equilibrium Analysis.
In this subsection I assume that all human capital investment decisions
have been made already and the proportion of managers of type with a high
level of social skills is q such that q ¸ ·=® and 1 ¡ q ¸ (1 ¡ ·)=®.4 I will
analyze the structure of the contracts o¤ered at this stage.
The game unfolds as follows. The …rm selects a type of manager it wants
to hire and o¤ers her a wage. It also o¤ers an incentive contract to a worker.
4If the human capital decision of an individual is endogenized one can solve for q.
5I restrict the set of possible incentive contracts to be a¢ne in the worker’s
output. The manager decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er. If the o¤er
is accepted the worker observes the type of the manager and the incentive
contract and chooses the e¤ort. Then the uncertainty over output is resolved
and the payo¤s are realized.
The equilibriumconcept we are going to use is that of the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). Let t 2 fS;Tg denote the type of the manager, and
de…ne a(¢) : fS;Tg ! f0;1g by a(t) = 1 if and only if a manager of type t
accepts the …rm’s o¤er. De…ne a binary variable b to be equal to one if and
only if the worker accepts the job. De…ne V (®;¯;±;e) = EU(®¯He + ®" +
±;e).
De…nition 1 (t(¯);w(¯);®(¯);±(¯);a(t);b(®;±;t);p(®;±;t)) constitute
a PBE if
1. a(t) = 1 if and only if w ¸ w
2. e 2 argmax(pV (®;¯H;±;e) + (1 ¡ p)V (®;¯L;±;e))
3. b = 1 if and only if
max
e (pV (®;¯H;±;e) + (1 ¡ p)V (®;¯L;±;e)) ¸ 0 (3)
64. (t(¯);w(¯);®(¯);±(¯)) solve
max(¯(1 ¡ ®)e ¡ ± ¡ w) (4)
s:t: a(t) = 1;b = 1; (5)
e 2 argmax(pV (®;¯H;±;e) + (1 ¡ p)V (®;¯L;±;e)): (6)
5. p(¢) is calculated using Bayes rule whenever possible.
In words, a PBE consists of a …rm’s decision on what type of manager to
hire and how much to pay her and what contract to propose to the worker,
manager’s decision of whether to accept the …rm’s o¤er, worker’s decision
whether to accept the contract, what e¤ortto exert if the contract is accepted,
and his belief about the …rm’s type. The de…nition of a PBE demands that
all the actions are rational given the beliefs, and the beliefs are consistent
with the equilibrium strategy. The following result is an immediate corollary
of the de…nition.
Proposition 1 In any PBE with a positive employment w = w.
Below I will be interesting in equilibria where the …rms’s type is revealed
in equilibrium.




y2(Á¾2(2x ¡ 1) + 2xy2 ¡ y2 + 2y ¡ 2)
2(Á¾2 + y2)
:
Assumption 1 H(¯L;¯L) < H(¯H;¯L).
Let us …rst assume that all managers have the same technical exper-
tise. Then a separating equilibrium does not exist. I formalize this result in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 be satis…ed and °H = °L = °. Then a
separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that a separating equilibrium exists.
Since there is no necessity to induce any e¤ort on the part of the manager,
she will always get the wage w. The worker, on the order hand, will face
an incentive contract. In the equilibrium the worker knows the marginal
product of his e¤ort. Given the assumptions on the worker’s preferences and
noise, it can be shown (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) that the …rm of type
¯ 2 f¯L;¯Hg will maximize the total certainty equivalent (TCE)


















It can be implemented by an a¢ne contract















It is straightforward to check that the pro…ts net of wages for a …rm of type
9¯i are given by
E(¦ ¡ w) = H(¯i;¯i) + ° ¡ w: (11)
However, if the …rm with low marginal product of e¤ort deviates and o¤ers
the same contract as a …rm with a high marginal product of e¤ort its pro…t
will be H(¯H;¯L) ¡ w Hence, under Assumption 1, there exists a pro…table
deviation and a separating equilibrium does not exist.
Q. E. D.
By continuity, Proposition 2 still holds if °H only slightly exceeds °L.
This implies that for a separating equilibrium to exist it should be su¢ciently
costly for a …rm to hire a socially skilled manager, so only …rms with high
marginal product of e¤ort will select this option.
Assumption 2
°L + H(¯H;¯H) > °H + H(¯L;¯H)
°H + H(¯L;¯L) > °L + H(¯H;¯L):
Assumption 2 states that the technical expertise of a manager is valuable
10enough. Hence only the e¤ort sensitive …rms will be willing to hire a manager
with a low level of technical expertise for the sake of increasing e¤ort.
Proposition 3 Assume that Assumption 2 is satis…ed. Then there exists a
separating equilibrium in which the managers of the social type are employed
by the e¤ort sensitive …rms, the managers of the technical type are employed
by the e¤ort insensitive …rms. Workers assign probability one of them being
at an e¤ort sensitive …rm if the manager is of the social type, and probability
zero otherwise. They face an incentive contract
























Proof of Proposition 3. First, assume that managers of social type
are employed by the e¤ort sensitive …rm and managers of technical type
are employed by the e¤ort insensitive ones. Then, on the equilibrium path,
workers should assign probability one of them being on an e¤ort sensitive
…rm if the manager is of social type, and probability zero otherwise. Hence,
in the equilibrium , the worker knows the type of …rm and the …rm faces a
standard principal-agent problem. Again, n a …rm of type $i$ can be assumed
to choose the implemented e¤ort by maximizing TCE









Following the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2, one can verify
that the optimal e¤ort is given by (10) and can be implemented by incentive
contract (8)-(9). The net of wages pro…t of the e¤ort insensitive …rm is given
by °H + H(¯L;¯L) ¡ w, while the pro…t of the e¤ort sensitive …rm is given
12by °L + H(¯H;¯H) ¡ w. By Assumption 2 these pro…t levels are incentive
compatible.
Q. E. D.
Proposition 3 implies that if there is a su¢ciently big di¤erential in tech-
nical skills of the two types of managers and a su¢ciently big di¤erence in
the marginal product of e¤ort across …rms, managers with di¤erent skills
will be hired by the di¤erent types of …rms. Given that there are more man-
agers than …rms and managers are indi¤erent about what skills to acquire
and where to be employed it can be also assumed that there are enough
managers of each type to satisfy the …rms’ demands.
In the separating equilibrium described above, beliefs of the workers de-
pend only on the type of the manager, not on the wage contract received.
It is the unique separating equilibrium with this property. Note that it is
also the only equilibrium which is constraint Pareto e¢cient and in which
workers earn zero rent.
2. General Equilibrium Analysis.
In this subsection I am going to analyze the decision of agents to invest in
human capital. Individuals live for two periods. In period one they have to
decide whether to acquire any kind of skills at cost c or to remain unskilled.
13In period two some of them are hired. The hired manages earn a salary
and workers face an incentive contract that leaves them no rents. There is
no discounting. Firms maximize their time average pro…ts. Assume that at
each moment new agents with a measure 2N® are born.
To proceed further we need the following assumption.
Assumption 3
°L + H(¯H;¯H) > 0
°H + H(¯L;¯L) > 0:
Assumption 3 states that both types of …rms will prefer to be in business
rather than shut down.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 2-3 be satis…ed. There exists a symmetric
stationary sequential equilibrium in which e¤ort sensitive …rms hire a man-
ager with high social skills, while e¤ort insensitive …rms hire a manager with






1 ¡ ® + ®exp(¡Ác)
: (16)
14Workers are o¤ered an incentive contract described in Proposition 3. If al-
most all …rms o¤ered a salary no lower then (14) at every date prior to t, each
individual acquires high social skills with probability ·=2, acquires technical
skills with probability (1¡·)=2, and acquires no skills at all with probability
1=2, otherwise nobody invests in any skills. Workers’ e¤ort level and beliefs
are given by Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that once the human capital invest-
ment decisions are made contracts o¤ered by the …rm and the e¤ort chosen
by the workers represent an equilibrium in this subgame due to Proposition 3.
To analyze the investment decisions note that a skilled individual is matched




(1 ¡ exp(¡Á(w ¡ c)) + (1 ¡
1
®
)(1 ¡ exp(Ác)). (17)
If an individual acquires no skills he gets expected utility zero. The wage
that makes the individual indi¤erent between the options is given by (14).
Firms never o¤er a salary higher then (14), since o¤ering salary (14) will be
15su¢cient to induce at least N individuals to invest in skills with at least ·N
investing in social and at least (1 ¡ ·)N in technical skills. They will also
never o¤er a salary below (14) because in this case there will be no skilled
labor from the next period on and the time average pro…ts will become zero.
Q. E. D.
Note that as Á ! 0 (14) implies w = ®c, that is, that expected salary
equals the cost of investment in the human capital.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I developed a model where workers did not know the
marginal product of their e¤ort. Hence, in addition to providing an incentive
contract the …rms have to signal their type. In this model they do it choos-
ing what type of manager to hire. In practice they may use other signalling
devices. Any arrangement that is provided at a su¢cient cost at the …rm’s
side can serve this purpose.
The discussion in the previous paragraph allows us to look at the results
obtained in this paper from a broader perspective and consider them as a
contribution into the compensating di¤erentials debate. The idea of com-
pensating di¤erentials, …rst formulated by Adam Smith [1776/1976], states
16that individuals have to be compensated for bad working conditions. De-
spite its plausibility, no empirical support for this idea has been found so
far. As noted by Duncan and Sta¤ord [1980] “a positive relation between
bad working conditions and wages is not typical for cross-sectional analysis.”
On the contrary, a positive correlation between good working conditions and
wages is typically observed. This observation led Doeringer and Piore [1982]
to formulate a dual labor market hypothesis.
A lack of empirical evidence is typically explained either by unobserved
workers’ heterogeneity [Gibbons and Katz 1992, Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard,
1992] or by measurement problems [Hamermesh, 1978]. Duncan and Holmud
[1983] showed, however, that the problem persisted after they controlled
for heterogeneity using panel data. Measurement problems generally will
cause the estimate of the magnitude of compensated di¤erentials to be biased
downward, but it is unlikely that the e¤ect will completely disappear or even
reverse sign.
The model proposed in this paper can explain a positive correlation be-
tween wages and good job characteristics in a population of homogeneous
workers. Note that even though workers earn di¤erent wages in equilibrium
they get the same utility. This is because the workers enjoying better working
17conditions and earning higher wages also exert higher e¤ort in equilibrium.
This distinguishes this model from models with heterogenous ability, where
workers earn rent on their ability. Hence, one might conclude that after all
the compensating di¤erentials do exist, but instead of compensating by bet-
ter wages for worse working conditions, workers are compensated by higher
wages and better working conditions for higher e¤ort.
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